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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
MARK E. CHILD, : Case No. 950070-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant/Appellant Mark E. Child relies on his opening 
brief and also refers this Court to that brief for the statements 
of jurisdiction, the issues, the case, the facts, and the summary 
of the argument. Appellant replies to the State's answer to his 
opening brief as follows. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
ORDERING RESTITUTION IN THE AMOUNT OF $45,443. 
Although the State claims that Appellant failed to 
marshal the evidence in this case, it fails to articulate the 
precise evidence it believes was not marshaled.1 While the 
1
 Where the State claims a defendant has not adequately 
marshaled the evidence, in fairness, this Court ought to require 
the State to outline the precise evidence it believes was not 
included. While in many cases, a party may be able to find an item 
not included in the marshaled evidence, the marshaling requirement 
is not aimed at requiring the party opposing the ruling to include 
an exhaustive list and extensive argument supporting the ruling. 
Rather, the requirement is designed to inform this Court as to the 
evidence supporting the ruling so that this Court may more readily 
ascertain whether the ruling was erroneous. Where the State makes 
a general assertion of failure to marshal, a defendant may feel 
compelled to repeat the State's evidence which is already outlined 
in Appellant's opening brief to establish that the marshaling 
State certainly argued the evidence in support of the order at 
greater length, Appellant nevertheless adequately met the 
marshaling requirement by explicitly outlining the State's 
evidence. A review of Appellant's opening brief establishes that 
Appellant cited the following evidence in support of the order. 
"In August 1991, Roger Ashment, the owner of Star 
Steel, hired Mark Child as the office manager for 
Star Steel. R. 295, 304. In that capacity, 
Child wrote payroll checks for all employees, 
managed the books, paid vendors, made purchases 
of materials and bid for jobs, and handled taxes. 
R. 198,304." 
Appellant's opening brief at 3. 
"Mr. Sherwood, the auditor, came up with a figure 
of $47,843.48. R. 196." . . . "He . . . compiled 
figures based on what he believed to be excess 
payroll, excess automobile allowance, checks made 
out to Child, checks made out to cash and signed 
by Child, and what Sherwood termed 'unauthorized' 
checks. R. 167, 169-73." 
Appellant's opening brief at 7. 
After vendors contacted Ashment, Ashment found 
discrepancies in the payment of vendors. "As a 
result of these discrepancies, in approximately 
January 1993, Ashment hired Thomas Sherwood, a 
Certified Public Accountant, to conduct an audit 
or review of the records of Star Steel." R. 164. 
Appellant's brief at 3. 
requirement was met. This requires an additional expenditure of 
resources and puts a defendant in the position of yet again 
outlining the State's evidence. Rather than affirming based on a 
general assertion that the party challenging the order failed to 
marshal the evidence, this Court should require the party seeking 
to benefit from the marshaling requirement to state the evidence it 
believes was not marshaled. The challenging party then would be in 
a position to discuss whether such evidence was indeed omitted and, 
if so, the importance of any such oversight. 
2 
Sherwood "testified that he found Child was 
overpaid as follows: 1991 payroll $452.14 
(R. 169), and automobile allowance $818.00 
(R. 16 9-70). Sherwood found checks in the amount 
of $16,425 made out to Child. R. 170. Sherwood 
also found checks made out to cash and signed by 
Child in the amount of $8,328.50 (R. 171). He 
found other checks which he claimed were 
unauthorized totalling $18,525.34. R. 171. 
Those checks were made out to cash, Mark Child or 
a utility which Sherwood testified had nothing to 
do with Star Steel. R. 173. Another set of 
checks totalled $1,900.00. R. 173. The total of 
all these checks was $47,843.45." 
Appellant's opening brief at 3-4. 
Appellant also pointed out that the State submitted a 
letter from Mr. Sherwood which indicates that $13,745 should not 
be credited Mr. Child because those cash deposits "'were traced 
through bank statements and have proved to be deposits made 
through other Star Steel accounts.'" Appellant's opening brief 
at 9 quoting Sherwood letter. In addition, Appellant included a 
copy of the letter in Addendum B to his opening brief. 
Although Appellant did not use the term "marshal," a 
review of his brief demonstrates that Appellant adequately 
marshaled the evidence supporting the trial judge's restitution 
order. 
In civil cases, the prevailing party must prove actual 
loss with a "reasonable certainty." Cook Assoc, v. Warnick, 664 
P.2d 1161, 1166 (Utah 1983). A reasonable certainty exists where 
"there is sufficient evidence to enable the trier of fact to make 
a reasonable approximation." Id. at 1166. At the very least, 
this standard of proof should apply in criminal cases. Appellant 
contends that the State failed to establish with reasonable 
3 
certainty that the amount of restitution ordered in this case 
reflected the actual loss sustained by the company. 
Although Appellant has only a high school diploma, he was 
responsible for the accounting in this company which made 
thousands of dollars in purchases and paid thousands of dollars 
in payroll each month. R. 428. The bookkeeping and records were 
disorganized and "slipshod." Defense counsel pointed out: 
And I think, Judge, that what's happened here is 
that there are purchases that quite, that can't 
quite be solidified through invoices, although 
nobody has taken the time to look through all the 
invoices to add them up to make sure that all the 
numbers correspond and correlate together, and 
because there was a debt due to the IRS and who 
else, Mr. Child is expected to be responsible for 
the entire amount. 
He's admitted responsibility for an amount, 
Judge, but he's not admitting responsibility for 
the entire amount. 
R. 428-29. Child maintains that in this case, where all of 
invoices and checks were not "solidified," the State did not 
establish to a reasonable certainty that the company sustained 
$45,443 in damages. 
The State contends that " [a]s part of his plea bargain, 
defendant agreed to pay full restitution. R. 430." State's 
brief at 24. The cited transcript page reflects, however, that 
the trial judge found that the defendant was required to make 
full restitution as part of his plea bargain and sentence. 
Indeed, the trial judge stated in part at R. 430: 
It'll be the finding of the court that the 
defendant is obligated, under the plea bargain, 
and under the sentencing order of this court, to 
make full restitution in an amount to be 
4 
determined by the court after having heard 
testimony. 
R. 430. 
Appellant acknowledged that he was responsible for 
restitution in the amount of $3,250 but maintained that he was 
not responsible for the "entire amount" of loss sustained by the 
company. R. 429-3 0. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant Child respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the restitution order and remand this case for a new 
hearing on the restitution issue. 
SUBMITTED this IQil day of May, 1996. 
O t ^ l M)CO/ 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
JAMES A. VALDEZ 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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